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Philippus: Three Strikes Sentencing Law

NOTE
CALIFORNIA'S FOUL STRIKE:
A SINGLE ACT PUNISHED WITH
TWO STRIKES

I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 14, 1998, the California Supreme Court decided
People v. Benson, l holding that prior convictions arising from
the same transaction may each be counted as "strikes" under
the Three Strikes law, even if the defendant did not receive a
sentence for one of the convictions. 2 The court stated that its
conclusion was consistent with the plain language of the Three
Strikes law as well as the history and legislative intent behind
the law.3 As a result of this decision, defendants can now potentially receive three strikes from one incident. 4
Section II of this Note fll'st provides an overview of the
Three Strikes law, and explains how a court determines sentence enhancement under the Three Strikes law. Sections III,
IV, and V describe the facts, procedural history, and the California Supreme Court's rationale for upholding the appellate
court's decision. Section VI of this Note critiques People v.
Benson, and the majority's conclusion that the language of the
Three Strikes law is sufficiently explicit to allow enhancement
of a sentence based on a conviction stayed pursuant to a statu-

1. 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998).
2. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 565 (Cal. 1998).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 570.
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tory prohibition against' punishing an act or omission under
more than one penal provision. Section VI also compares the
Supreme Court's holding in People v. Benson with its holding in
People v. Romero,5 and critiques the amount of discretion
awarded to the trial court. Filially, Sections VII and VIII conclude that danger lies in relinquishing discretion to the trial
court, as it remains unclear whether voters intended that an
act that may only be punished once could generate two strikes.
II. OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW
During the last decade, many states enacted multiple offense statutes in response to rising crime rates. 6 These "Three
Strikes laws" provide aggravated penalties for recidivist offenders. 7 Both California's legislature and the electorate enacted versions of a Three Strikes law. 8 California's Three
Strikes law is a two-tiered plan, which focuses on both two and
three time convicted felons. 9 Under the law, a defendant's sentence may be enhanced by prior convictions, otherwise known
as "strikes."lo Yet the California Supreme Court recently decreased the strength of the Three Strikes law in People v. Romero,l1 ruling that a trial court retains discretion to dismiss
strikes if the court determines that it is in the furtherance of
justice. 12

5. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
6. See Angie Cannon, 3-Strikes Laws Swing and Miss, Survey Indicates, DENY.
POST, Sept. 10, 1996. at Al.
7. See Franklin E. Zimring, Essay, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on 'Three Strikes' in California, 28 PAC. L.J.
243,245 (1996).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1999) & CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12
(West Supp. 1999). "Three Strikes Law" is used in this article to describe both the
statute adopted by the legislature, 1994 Cal. Stat. Ch. 12, sec. 1 (AB 971) (enacting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1999», and the initiative, Proposition 184,
adopted by the electorate in a general election on Nov. 8, 1994 (enacting CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999».
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999).
10. See id.
11. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
12. See People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996). See infra notes 56-72 and
accompanying text for discussion of People v. &mero.
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CREATION OF THE THREE STRIKES LAW

Multiple offense statutes imposing heightened sentences for
repeat offenders have a long history in the United StateS. 13 In
recent years a demand for such laws has grown in reaction to
rising crime rates, violent gang-related crimes, children carrying guns, crimes committed by recidivists, and children being
targeted by gun dealers. 14 In response to this public alarm
against violent crime, many states enacted multiple offense
statutes during the 1990's.15
In response to the senseless murder of his eighteen-year-old
daughter, Kimber Reynolds, Mike Reynolds proposed California's fIrst version of a multiple offense statute. 16 His version of
Three Strikes differed from the other proposals being debated
across the country in three respects. 17 First, he proposed that
signifIcant sentencing enhancements should be imposed upon
conviction for a second felony. 18 Second, Reynolds proposed
that a criminal should receive a twenty-fIve year to life sen-

13. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 400 (1997). American legislatures have enacted statutes enhancing punishment for repeat offenders since 1796. See id.
14. See Chuck Lindell et aI., The Spark of Fear, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 15,
1991, at AI.
15. See Angie Cannon, 3-Strikes Laws Swing and Miss, Suroey Indicates, DENV.
POST, Sept. 10, 1996, at AI. In 1993, Washington was the only state to enact three
strikes legislation. In 1994, twelve states enacted three strikes legislation: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In 1995, nine states enacted three
strikes legislation: Arkansas, Florida, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. See id. See also Diane Jennings, Bruce Tomaso,
Society to Face Rising Costs ofAging Prison Population, Experts Wonder Whether Texas
System can Seep up as Inmate Numbers Swell under Long-term Sentencing, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 1998, at AI. In 1995, both Oklahoma and Texas enacted
three strikes legislation. See id.
16. See George Skelton, A Father's Crusade &rn from Pain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1993, at A3. One evening in 1992, Kimber had just finished having dinner with a
friend, and was getting into her car when two men drove up on a stolen motorcycle.
One grabbed for her purse, and as she struggled with him, she was fatally shot. The
killer was a parolee, and was wanted for a series of robberies and assaults. See id. See
Dan Morain, A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, Mike Reynolds Vowed that His Murdered
Daughter Would Not Die in Vain; Few Thought He Would Win, But Today He Will See
the 'Three Strikes' Bill Signed Into Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at AI.
17. See Zimring, supra note 7, at 245.
18. See id.
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tence for his second felony even in the absence of violence. 19
Finally, Reynolds proposed that the third strike could be generated by any felony conviction under the California Penal
Code.20
Initially, Reynolds' Three Strikes package received little
support from the general public. 21 Ultimately, however, the
1993 murder of twelve-year old Polly Klaas ended the public's
apathy and indecisiveness regarding California's multiple offense statute. 22 Recently paroled from the state prison, a twiceconvicted violent offender abducted Polly from her Petaluma
home.23 Sadly, Polly's murder was the turning point in obtaining the necessary signatures to put Reynolds' Three Strikes
bill on the California ballot. 24 Additional support for the Three
Strikes bill arose when President Clinton signed the Violent
Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the federal version of

19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Michael Krikorian, Striking up a Debate, THE FRESNO BEE, July 27, 1998,
at B1. Currently twenty-four states have some form of three strikes legislation in
place. California is the only state that does not require the third offense to be a major
crime. See id. See George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born {rom Pain, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1993, at A3. Mike Reynolds, Kimber's father, was the driving force behind
California's three strikes bill, targeted at career criminals. Reynolds initially had
difficulty in obtaining enough signatures to add the bill to the California ballot. See id.
22. See Tupper Hull, State's Parole System Attacked: Many Wonder Why Davis,
With Long Record, Was Free - The Polly Klaas Kidnapping, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER,
Dec. 5,1993, at AI. Richard Allen Davis had been in and out of prison since he was 19
years of age. He had six convictions prior to the murder, ranging from burglary to
assault with a deadly weapon. See id. See Richard Price, Town Angry at a System that
Failed, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1993, at lA. Davis' rap sheet was 11 pages long, including
two prior kidnapping convictions. In his most recent stay in prison-a 16-year sentence for kidnapping, assault, and burglary-he had served only half of his sentence
before early release for good behavior. Davis would have been in jail on the day Polly
Klaas was abducted if he had served his entire sentence. See id.
23. See Hull, supra note 22, at AI.
24. See id. See David B. Magleby & Kelly D. Patterson, Consultants and Direct
Democracy, POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS, June 1, 1998, Vol. 31, No.2. Use of the
baseball slogan, "Three Strikes and you're out!" also played an important role in increasing the public awareness and support for the three strikes sentencing legislation.
The phrase "three strikes, and you're out" has been credited with attracting support to
the three strikes movement. See id.
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the Three Strikes legislation.25 The federal Act imposes life
sentences for a third violent felony conviction. 26

In March 1994, California Governor Pete Wilson signed
Reynolds' Three Strikes program into law. 27 California voters
approved an identical version of the bill, state Proposition 184,
in November 1994.28 The current version of the Three Strikes
law specifies punishment for persons who commit any subsequent felony and have one or more prior violent or serious felony convictions. 29
B.

CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 1170.12

The purpose of California's Three Strikes law is to "[e]nsure
longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who
commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious
and/or violent felony offenses. »30 The Three Strikes law is designed to provide a "no questions asked" policy in sentencing a

25. See Sam Vincent Meddis, All 3 Candidates Talking Tough, USA TODAY, Oct.
26, 1992, at lOA. See 18 U.S.C § 3559(c) (1990 & Supp. 1999). Section 3559(c) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted in a
court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to
imprisonment if-{A) the person has been convicted (and those convictions
have become fmal) on separate prior occasions in a court of the United States
or of a State of-{i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or (ii) one or more
serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses; and (B) each
serious violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sentencing
under this subsection, other than the first, was committed after the
defendant's conviction of the preceding serious violent felony or serious drug
offense.
[d.
26.
27.

See id.
See Stuart Pfeifer, Second Chances vs. 'Three Strikes' Law, THE ORANGE

COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 26, 1997, at AI. This bill is codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.
28. See id. This proposition is codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12.
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12
(West Supp. 1999).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999) (as stated in the statement of
intent preceding the text of §1170.12 in Prop. 184). The California Penal Code currently contains two similar provisions regulating sentencing impositions for persons
convicted of a felony, who have previously committed one or more "violent" or "serious"
felonies. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12. Because both statutes are nearly identical, for purposes of this Note, all references made hereinafter to California's three
strikes legislation are to California Penal Code section 1170.12. Section 1170.12 is the
initiative version, which was in effect when the defendant committed the crime in the
present case. See id. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 558 (1998).
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career
tion. 3l
tences
felony
ony.32

criminal to life imprisonment for a third felony convicThe Three Strikes law authorizes lengthy prison senfor defendants with at least one prior violent or serious
conviction who are found guilty of any subsequent fel-

The version of the Three Strikes law enacted by the electorate is codified in section 1170.12 of the California Penal Code. 33
Section 1170.12 is a two-tiered plan, which enhances the sentence of criminals convicted of two or three felonies. 34 The sentence enhancement provisions' are triggered only when a prior
conviction is classified as a strike. 35 Under section 1170.12(b),
a strike is a "serious" or "violent" felony identified in the sta~
ute. 36 The statute enumerates nineteen violent felonies, which
qualify as strikes including: murder, home robbery and rape. 37

31. Peter H. King, That Grinding Sound, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13. 1994, at A3.
32. See id. § 1170.12. See Steve Lawrence, Lawmakers Refuse to Narrow List of
Felonies for '3 Strikes: Senate: 10 Democrats Join A Vote to Sink the Proposal. A
Prison Population Boom is Feared and Disputed, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, June
5, 1997, at A4. Since its enactment in 1994, the Three Strikes law has been subject to
much criticism and debate. One of the largest debates has been over the type of prior
conviction that will produce an enhanced sentence under the Three Strikes law. Oppo·
nents believe that the law's punishment often does not fit the crime. These opponents
propose that the Three Strikes law should be limited to only violent and serious felonies, arguing that only twenty-five percent of second strikers and fifty percent of third
strikers were committed to prison for a serious or violent offense. See id. See Assembly
Committee on Public Safety: Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on
Judiciary, Criminal Procedure and Budget and Fiscal Review, 1997-1998 Legis., June
30, 1998 (statement of Judith M. Garvey). In response to these arguments, the California Senate proposed a bill that would limit enhanced punishment under the Three
Strikes law to persons who are convicted of a violent or serious felony and also have
two or more prior violent or serious felony convictions. Supporters of Senate Bill 2048
noted that possession of controlled substances, petty theft with a prior, and second
degree burglary are the most common commitment offenses for second strikers; tht:)
most common offenses for third strikers are burglary, robbery, and pOBsession of controlled substances. See id.
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id. § 1170.12(b)(1)(A-B). Section 1170.12(b) provides that "[nlotwithstanding
any other provision oflaw ... a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as: (1) Any
offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state." Id.
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1999). Section 667.5 lists the
following felonies as "violent": Murder; Voluntary Manslaughter; Mayhem; Rape; Sodomy or Oral copulation by force, or fear; Lewd acts committed on a child under the age
of 14; any felony punishable by death or a life sentence; any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on a victim; any felony in which the defendant uses a
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The statute also identifies thirty-four serious felonies which
qualify as strikes, including all violent felonies, attempts to
commit violent felonies, residential burglary and some drug
sales to minors.38 Furthermore, section 1170.12(b) mandates
that a stay of execution of sentence does not affect the classification of a prior conviction as a "strike."39 Section 1170.12 requires the prosecuting attorney to plead and prove each prior
felony conviction. 40 Moreover, plea-bargaining is not allowed

firearm; any robbery committed with a deadly weapon in an inhabited dwelling or in
the inhabited portion of any other building; Rape where the act is accomplished against
the victim's will by force or fear; Attempted murder; Any explosion or attempted explosion of abomb with intent to murder; Kidnapping; Continuous sexual abuse of a child;
Carjacking if the defendant used a deadly weapon; Any robbery of the first degree
punishable pursuant to subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section
213; Conspiracy to rape or attempt to rape. See id.
38. See id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1999), describes with particularity those felonies considered "serious": Murder; Attempted Murder; Voluntary
manslaughter; Mayhem; Rape; Sodomy or Oral Copulation by force or fear; Lewd act on
a child under the age of 14 years; any felony punishable by death or a life sentence; any
felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on a victim; any
felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm; Assault with intent to commit
rape, mayhem, sodomy, oral copulation, or robbery; Assault with a deadly weapon on a
peace officer; Assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; Assault with a deadly weapon
by an inmate; Arson; Exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to
injure or murder or causing great bodily injury or mayhem; Burglary of an inhabited
dwelling or inhabited portion of any other building; Robbery or Bank Robbery; Kidnapping; Holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state prison; Attempt to commit a
felony punishable by death or a life sentence; any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; Selling, furnishing, administering, giving,
or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor any serious drug; Rape where
the act is accomplished against the victim's will by force or fear; Grand theft involving
a firearm; Carjacking; Continuous sexual abuse of a child; Assault with caustic chemicals or flammable substances; Assault with a deadly weapon on a frreflghter; Conspiracy to rape or attempt to rape; Commission of a felony with a frrearm; Any attempt to
commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than assault. See id.
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(1)(A-B) (West Supp. 1999). Section 1170.12
provides that "Inlone of the following dispositions shall affect the determination that a
prior conviction is a prior felony ... (A) The suspension of imposition of judgment or
sentence. (B) The stay of execution of sentence." Ii A stay is "the act of arresting a
judicial proceeding by the order of a court." A stay of execution of sentence is "the
stopping or arresting of execution on a judgment, that is, of the of the judgmentcreditor's right to issue execution, for a limited period." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1413
(6th ed. 1990).
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(1) (West Supp. 1999). The Penal Code
states that "[tlhe prosecuting attorney shall plead and prove each prior felony conviction ..." Id.
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on the second or third strike. 41 However, the prosecution has
the power to dismiss a strike in the furtherance of justice. 42
The fIrst level of section 1170.12 affects convicted felons who
have one prior serious or violent felony conviction on their record, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the defendant committed the previous felony.43 For these offenders, a second conviction of any felony results in a sentence double the term provided as punishment for the new offense. 44 The sentence for
the second felony and the enhancement run consecutively. 45 If

41. See id. § 1170.12(e). Section 1170.12 requires that "[plrior felony convictions
shall not be used in plea bargaining, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7 ....n
Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West Supp. 1999) bars plea bargaining only
after the filing of an indictment or 'information. Thus, there is no restriction on plea
bargaining under Penal Code section 1192.7 in the municipal court before the defen·
dant is held to answer. See id.
42. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2) (West Supp. 1999). The Penal Code
states that "[tlhe prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony
conviction allegation in the interest of justice pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, or if
there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction. n Id.
43. See id. § 1170. 12(b)(2). Section 1170.12 provides that "[nlothwithstanding any
other provision of law and for the purposes of this section, a prior conviction of a felony
shall be defined as ... [al conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed in California, is punishable by imprisonment in state prison .... n Id.
44. See id. § 1170.12(c)(1).
45. See id. § 1170.12(a)(6-8). Section 1170.12(a)(6) states that "[ilf there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and
not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant
consecutively on each count pursuant to this section." Id. Thus, when II defendant has
at least one strike, and he or she has been convicted of more than one current felony,
this section mandates consecutive sentencing on each current felony.
Section
1170.12(a)(7) provides:
If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent felony as
described in paragraph (6) of this subdivision, the court shall impose the
sentence for each conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other
conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the
manner prescribed by law.
Id.
Thus, when at least two of the current felonies are "serious or violent: this section
applies. Finally, section 1170.12(a)(8) states that "[alny sentence imposed pursuant to
this section will be imposed consecutive to any other sentence which the defendant is
already serving, unless otherwise provided by law." Id. This section affects cases
where a defendant is already serving a sentence and then is sentenced under the Three
Strikes law in a new case. Section 1170.12(a)(8) mandates that the new sentence be
served consecutively to the prior one. See id. A second sentence is deemed to be consecutive "[wlhen one sentence of confinement is to follow another in point of time."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 304 (6th ed. 1990). Yet a sentence is concurrent when "[tlwo
or more terms of imprisonment, all or part of each term of which is served simultaneously and the prisoner is entitled to discharge at the expiration of the longest term
served. n Id. at 291.
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the second conviction encompasses more than one crime, consecutive sentences and enhancements are imposed for each
conviction. 46 For example, if an offender has one prior strike on
his record for robbery, and commits a new felony of residential
burglary, he or she would get sentenced to thirteen years m
prison. 47
The second level of section 1170.12 applies to felons with
two or more serious or violent prior felony convictions who then
commit any subsequent felony.48 However, this section distinctly differs from the fIrst level in the severity of the sentence
imposed. 49 Unlike the sentence for the second-time felon, the
three-time convicted felon's sentence is an indeterminate life
sentence. 50 The mjnjmum term of the indeterminate life sentence is the greater of three possibilities: three times the sentence for the current felony conviction, state imprisonment for
twenty-fIve years, or the sentence as determined by the court
for the current conviction plus any applicable enhancements
pursuant to section 1170 of the California Penal Code. 51 Thus,
the third time convicted felon can be assured of being sentenced to a term of at least twenty-fIve years up to life imprisonment.52 Because the statute calls for the greater penalty,
however, the third time sentence most often results in life imprisonment. 53 For example, if a defendant had two prior strikes

46. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(7) (West Supp. 1999).
47. See AL MENASTER & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, 3 STRIKES MANUAL 111 (Compendium Press 1996). If the sentencing court chose a mid-term sentence of four years for
the new burglary conviction, twice this amount is eight years. Then, with the dual use
of the enhancement for the "serious felony" prior of five years, the defendant would
ultimately receive a thirteen-year sentence. See id.
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
49. Seeid. § 1170.12.
50. See id. § 1170.12(c)(2)(A).
51. See id. § 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i-iii).
52. Seeid. § 1170.12.
53. See Lisa Cowert, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion:
California's Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 624 (1998) (discussing the policy concerns intertwined with the Three Strikes law and advocating
rehabilitation rather than retribution). See Assembly Committee on Public Safety:
Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on Judiciary, Criminal Procedure
and Budget and Fiscal Review, 1997-1998 Legis., June 30, 1998 (statement of Judith
M. Garvey). The Three Strikes law has been subject to a large amount of debate because most offenders with two or more "strikes" receive a sentence of life imprisonment, even if they did not commit a violent or serious crime. See id. See Steven
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for robbery and residential burglary, and then committed a
third strike, another residential burglary, under the Three
Strikes law he or she must spend 25 years in prison before being eligible for parole. 54
Since its enactment, the Three Strikes law has been subject
to much judicial review to determine the scope of the law. In
one such case, the Three Strikes law has been interpreted as
giving trial courts discretion to strike felony convictions of defendants eligible for sentencing under the sentence enhancement scheme. 65

Pressman & Jennifer Kaae, The Law was Intended to Send a Clear Message to &peat
Criminals - But No One Agrees what the Message is, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Oct. 1996, at
38. The outrage over the current configuration of the Three Strikes law has been aggravated by particular cases popularized by the media. For example, in Riverside a
homeless man received a sentence oftwenty-nine years to life when he was convicted of
shoplifting cologne samples, a razor kit and a flashlight from K-Mart. The defendant's
other strikes consisted of two robberies in the 1970s and a residential burglary in 1987.
In another case, a 27- year old man received his third strike when he stole a slice of
pepperoni pizza. Before the pizza escapade, the man had been convicted of robbery,
attempted robbery, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and possession of a controlled
substance. Under California's Three Strikes law, he was sentenced to a mandatory
twenty-five years to life. See id. See also Michael J. Daponde, Parolees No Longer
Walk Following Serious Felonies - Incarceration Mandatory, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
552,555 (1998).
54. See MENASTER & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 113-114. Under Penal Code
section 1170.12(c)(2)(i), three times the court selects for the current offense (the residential burglary which carries a high term of six years), would be eighteen years if the
court selected the high term. Under subdivision (c)(2)(iii), the base term for the new
offense in this example, six years, would be added to all enhancements under Penal
Code section 1170 (two "serious felony" priors which each carry a five-year term), ten
years, equaling sixteen years. Because the twenty-five year sentence provided in subdivision (c)(2)(ii) is greater than 18 or 16 years, this defendant must spend twenty-five
years in prison before being eligible for parole plus a consecutive determinate sentence
of ten years for dual use of the priors. See id. See Little Hoover Commission Report,
Jan. 1998, p. 14. Critics project that the state of California will be forced to build new
prisons or release other inmates unless the Three Strikes law is scaled back. Statistics
indicate that the total state prison population will increase substantially in the coming
years, in large part because of the Three Strikes law. See id. See Assembly Committee
on Public Safety: Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on Judiciary,
Criminal Procedure and Budget and Fiscal &view, 1997-1998 Legis., June 30, 1998
(statement of Judith M. Garvey). The Three Strikes law has been criticized for not only
clogging the prisons, but also the court system. The backlog of felony criminal cases has
pushed misdemeanor and low-level felony cases out of court, as well as civil cases in
some jurisdictions. See id.
55. See People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996).
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C.
PEOPLE V. ROMERO: NARROWING OF THE THREE STRIKES
LAw
Until recently, a court's discretion in sentencing a repeat
offender was limited. 56 The Three Strikes law specifically empowered the prosecution to move to dismiss a strike or strike a
prior felony conviction allegation "in the furtherance of justice."57 However, the law remained unclear on whether it
granted the courts the same power to dismiss. 58
In People v. Romero,59 the California Supreme Court examined whether a trial court may, sua sponte, strike prior felony
convictions in cases arising under California's Three Strikes
laws. 60 The Romero court ruled that a trial court retains discretion to dismiss one or more prior felony convictions, or

56. See Cowert, supra note 53, at 624. Until the Romero decision, the Three
Strikes law removed sentencing discretion from the judiciary in sentencing habitual
offenders, and instead granted the discretion to the prosecutor, forcing a standoff be·
tween the judiciary and the legislature over sentencing discretion. See id.
57. CAL. PENAL CODE §.1170.12(d)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
58. See id.
59. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
60. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 630. Romero was charged with second degree burglary in violation of California Penal Code § 459, attempted burglary of an inhabited
dwelling in violation of Penal Code §§ 459, 664, first degree burglary of an inhabited
dwelling in violation of Penal Code § 459, and possession of a controlled substance in
violation of Health and Safety Code § 11350. Romero's two prior serious felonies of
burglary and attempted burglary convictions qualified as "strikes" under the Three
Strikes law, making him a third time offender eligible for a life sentence under the
second level of the statute. Romero originally plead not guilty. See id. at 632. However, the trial judge offered to dismiss the Romero's prior convictions for three strikes
purposes if he changed his plea. The court subsequently struck Romero's prior felony
convictions and imposed a six-year sentence as opposed to the sentence of life imprisonment mandated under the Three Strikes law. The district attorney petitioned for a
writ of mandamus to vacate the judge's order, arguing that the express language of the
Three Strikes law did not grant the judge the power to dismiss prior felony allegations
except when requested by the prosecution. The Court of Appeal determined that the
trial court could not dismiss prior felony convictions on its own motion. The appellate
court ordered the trial court to vacate the sentence and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. The California Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for
review. Reversing in part, the Supreme Court held that a trial court may dismiss prior
felony convictions in furtherance of justice on its own motion in a case brought under
the Three Strikes law. See id. at 630. An information is "an accusation exhibited
against a person for some criminal offense, without an indictment ... [~rl without the
intervention of a grand jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990). A writ of
mandamus "[clommand[sl the performance of a particular act therein specified ... or
directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of which he has been
illegally deprived." [d. at 961.
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strikes, if the trial court concludes that it is "in furtherance of
justice. »61
The court focused on Penal Code section 1385(a), which
grants the court the general power to strike prior convictions in
furtherance of justice. 62 The Supreme Court stated that unless
the legislature clearly intended to eliminate the power granted
to the courts under Penal Code section 1385(a), California's
Three Strikes statutes should not be read as abolishing a trial
court's power to dismiss strikes in three strikes cases. 63 The
court reasoned that the legislature would not have included a
provision in the Three Strikes law that allows the prosecuting
attorney to strike a prior felony conviction pursuant to 1385
unless it also intended that the court retain its power under
section 1385.64 Thus, the Romero court ruled that trial courts
may exercise the power to dismiss strikes at any time, before
trial or after trial, but suggested that it might be most appropriate at sentencing.65

Romero, 917 P.2d at 629.
62. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 632. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West Supp. 1999).
Section 1385 provides that:
(a) The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon
application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an
action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an
order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause
which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading. (b) This
section does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious
felony for purposes of enhancement of a sentence under Section 667.
61.

[d.

63. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 640.
64. See id. at 642.
65. See id. at 648. See People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1998). However, the
California Supreme Court has further defined what a trial court should consider in .
deciding whether to dismiss a strike "in furtherance of justice." In ruling whether to
strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding
under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, "in furtherance of justice" pursuant to
Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in
whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had presently not commit·
ted one or more felonies and/or had not previously been convicted of one or more serio
ous and/or violent felonies. See id.
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However, the court also cited several examples of when the
court might abuse this discretion. 66 The court warned that a
dismissal of a strike must truly be in the furtherance of justice. 67 Specifically, the Romero court held that the trial court
may not strike prior convictions solely for judicial convenience,
court congestion, a judge's hostility to the Three Strikes law, or
because the defendant pleads guilty.68 The court's decision was
fully retroactive. 69
The Three Strikes law has now taken a new tum in California with the problem of determining whether two strikes can
arise from one act, even though one of the convictions was
stayed pursuant to the prohibition on multiple punishment. 70
The California Supreme Court's ruling in People v. Benson71 is
the first decision on how the Three Strikes law affects such
cases, and its repercussions are sure to affect scores of criminal
defendants throughout the state of California. 72

66. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 648-649.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 648. See Dan Morain, Assembly OKs Bill Limiting Judges' 3-Strikes
Leniency Legislature. L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1996, at AI. The California legislature
reacted immediately to Romero with the General Assembly's passage of Senate Bill
331, which curtailed judicial discretion by barring the judiciary from dismissing prior
felony conviction allegations for violent felonies. See id. See S.B. 331, 1996-1997 Legis.
(Cal. 1996). Under Senate Bill 3:31, the court has the discretion to strike a defendant's
prior felony conviction, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney' or upon its own motion
if three requirements are met. First, none of the defendant's prior convictions could be
for a violent felony. Second, the defendant's current conviction could not be for a serious or violent felony. Third, the current offense must have occurred more than five
years after the defendant's release from custody for the prior felony conviction. See id.
See Dan Morain & Max Vanzi, Senate Panel Blocks Revisions of 3-Strikes Law, L.A.
TIMES, July 17, 1996, at AI. However, on July 16, 1996, by a four-to-one vote, the
Senate Criminal Procedure Committee voted against sending the bill to the Senate
floor, denying any opportunity for a full Senate hearing on the bill. In rejecting the bill
the Committee cited confusing language and concern over the fact that eighty percent
of felons sentenced under Three Strikes laws are nonviolent as the primary factors.
See id.
70. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A.
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI.
71. Benson, 954 P.2d at 557.
72. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A.
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI.
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III.

FACTS OF PEOPLE v. BENSON

In 1979, Russell Benson went to a neighbor's apartment under the guise of borrowing her vacuum cleaner.73 After he returned the vacuum, he went back to the apartment a second
time, claiming he forgot his keys.74 Once inside her apartment,
Benson grabbed the victim from behind, struggled with her and
forced her to the floor.75 Benson then proceeded to stab her approximately twenty times over her entire body with a knife. 76
Miraculously, the victim survived the attack and was able to
identify Benson as her attacker.77 The victim undelwent four
major surgeries and was severely scarred as a result of the attack. 78 The police discovered a knife and bloody clothing in
Benson's apartment and arrested him for the crimes committed
against his neighbor. 79
Subsequently, a jury convicted Benson of residential bur. glary and assault with intent to commit murder.80 Benson was
also found to have used a knife during the commission of a felony and inflicted great bodily injury to the victim in commission of the crimes. 81 On October 16, 1980, the trial court sen-

73. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 558 (Cal. 1998).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 558.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. See CAL PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1999). The Penal Code ~tates
that "[e)very person who enters any house, room, apartment ... store, ... with intent to
commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." Id. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 217 (West 1988). Law of Jan. I, 1981, repealed by Stats. 1980, ch. 300, § 2, p.
628. Benson was originally convicted for assault with intent to commit murder pursuant to Penal Code section 217. However, section 217 was repealed in 1980. Id. See
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 664(a) (West Supp. 1999). Section 664 of t.he Penal Code
provides that "[iJf the crime attempted is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison, the person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed upon conviction of the offense
attempted." Id.
81. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022(b)(1) (West Supp.
1999). Section 12022(b) provides:
Any person who personally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon in the
commission or attempted commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that
felony or attempted felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment
prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been
convicted, be punished by an additional term of one year, unless use of a
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tenced Benson to state prison for ten years for the residential
burglary charge. 82 However, Benson's sentence for the assault
with intent to commit murder was stayed. 83 After serving five
years, Benson was released on parole from state prison on September 12, 1985.84
Nine years later on November 30, 1994, while shopping in a
discount store, Benson stuffed several packages of cigarettes in
his pockets and in the sleeves of his jacket and walked out of
the store without paying for them. 85 Having observed Benson's
actions, security personnel tried to detain him outside of the
store but Benson fled. 86 The security guards caught up with
Benson, however, and ultimately arrested him. 87 The total
value of the merchandise Benson stole was twenty dollars. 88
Benson was charged with second degree robbery, second degree burglary, and petty theft with a prior conviction based
upon the 1979 incident. 89 A jury found Benson guilty of petty
deadly or dangerous weapon is an element of the offense of which he or she
was convicted.

[d.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7 (West 8upp. 1999). This section states:
Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other
than an accomplice in the commission or attempted commission of a felony
shall, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony
or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be punished by an
additional term of three years, unless infliction of great bodily injury is an
element of the offense of which he or she is convicted.
[d.

82. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. 8061678 (filed
Dec. 29, 1997).
83. See id. See supra note 39 for a definition of a stay.
84. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
85. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. 8061678 (filed
Dec. 29, 1997).
86. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. 8061678 (filed Oct.
29, 1997).
87. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed
Dec. 29, 1997).
88. See w.
89. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct.
29, 1997). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1988), which states "Irlobbery is the felo·
nious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immedi"ate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.n [d.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1999). See supra note 80 for definition of
burglary. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West Supp. 1999). Section 666 states in part:
Every person who, having been convicted of ... burglary ... and having served
a term therefor in any penal institution or having been imprisoned therein as
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theft with a prior conviction, not guilty of robbery, and was
deadlocked on the burglary count. 90 The court coWlted Benson's 1980 burglary and assault with intent to commit murder
convictions as two prior strikes under California's Three
Strikes law. 91 During sentencing, the trial court considered
Benson's 1994 conviction of petty theft with a prior to be his
third strike and sentenced him to state prison for twenty-five
years to life.92 Had his earlier conviction been considered only
as one strike, Benson would have faced a maxnnum six-year
sentence. 93
IV.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Benson requested that the trial court review his sentence
for the 1994 discount store incident and strike the prior conviction allegations, arguing that the court violated the proscription against double punishment contained within Penal Code
section 654 by counting each 1980 conviction as a strike. 94 The

a condition of probation for that offense, is subsequently convicted of petit
theft, then the person convicted of that subsequent offense is punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison.
[d.

90. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct.
29, 1997).
91. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999). See CAL. PENAL CODE §
667.5(c)(8), (12) (West Supp. 1999). Assault with intent to commit murder is a violent
felony. See id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(8), (9), (18), (23) (West Supp. 1999).
Residential burglary is a serious felony, and assault with intent to commit murder is
also a serious felony. Each one of these crimes is a qualifying prior felony conviction
for the purposes of the Three Strikes law. See id.
92. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 557.
93. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A.
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI.
94. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 559 (Cal. 1998). Benson claimed that the
trial court erred in counting both the burglary and assault with intent to commit murder counts from the 1980 convictions as separate strikes under California's Three
Strikes law. See id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1999). Section 654 of the
Penal Code provides that: "[aln act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law shall be punished ... but in no case shall the !Ict or omission
be punished under more than one provision." [d. When a defendant is convicted or
pleads guilty to two or more crimes section 654 bars multiple punishment for the same
act. See id. See People v. Mendoza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). The
purpose of section 654 is to prevent multiple punishment for single a(:t or omission,
even though that act or omission violates more than one statute and thus constitutes
more than one crime. Although distinct crimes may be charged in separate counts and
may result in multiple verdicts of guilt, trial courts may impose sentence for only one
offense. On the other hand, multiple punishment is proper if the evidence discloses
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trial court found no violation of section 654, however, and denied the defendant's motion to strike his prior convictions. 95
The court stated it lacked the authority to strike a prior conviction allegation. The court also refused to reduce the petty theft
conviction to a misdemeanor.96
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
judgment.97 The appellate court determined that Benson's
prior burglary conviction could be used counted both as a prior,
elevating the petty theft conviction to a felony, and as a strike
under California's Three Strikes law. 98 The court also held that
Benson's prior offenses that were part of the same incident
could be separate strikes under the Three Strikes law. 99 The
appellate court then remanded the case to allow the trial court
to exercise its discretion to strike one of the prior conviction
allegations as permitted in People v. Romero. 1oo

that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives, which were independent of
and not merely incidental to each other. See id. See Neal v. State of California, 357
P.2d 839, 843-844 (Cal. 1960). The California Supreme Court defined a test to determine what is an indivisible course of conduct:
[wlhether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to
more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent
and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective,
the defendant may be punished for anyone of such offenses but not for more
than one.
[d. In Neal, the separate punishment imposed on the defendant for arson could
not stand because the objective of the offense was to commit the two attempted
murders. Because there were two individual intents separate punishments were
proper. See id.
95. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559.
96. See Appellant's Petition for Review, People v. Benson, No .. S061678 (filed May
27, 1997).
97. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
98. See id. The Court of Appeal first noted that Penal Code section 654 bars multiple punishment for the same act. See id. at 699. The appellate court then recognized
the holding in People v. Pearson, which held that when a defendant is convicted or
pleads guilty to two or more crimes, and section 654 would bar multiple punishment for
the crimes, the crimes may not be used as separate priors in subsequent proceedings.
See People v. Pearson, 721 P.2d 595, 600-601 (Cal. 1986). The Pearson court held that
this rule applies unless the legislature explicitly states that subsequent action may be
based on the stayed convictions. See id. Yet the Benson court rejected the defendant's
contention that the Three Strikes law is ambiguous. See Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
699-700. The court stated the language was clear, and they need go no further than
the language of the statute. See id.
99. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
100. See id. (citing People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996». In Romero, the
court ruled that a trial court retains discretion to strike one or more prior felony con-
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Benson appealed to the California Supreme Court, questioning whether multiple felonies could be punished as separate strikes when they arose from a single criminal act. 101 Benson contended that the trial court erred by treating his 1980
convictions as two strikes, arguing that his burglary and assault with intent to commit murder convictions compromised a
single act against a single victim and were contemporaneously
committed with a single intent. 102 Because the 1980 convictions
were punished as a single crime pursuant to Penal Code section 654, Benson argued that the crimes should not individually be counted as strikes. 103 The California Supreme Court
granted review. 104
V.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Benson, the majority of the California Supreme Court
held that prior convictions arising from the same set of facts
should each be counted as strikes for purposes of sentencing
under the Three Strikes law, even if the sentence on one of the
prior convictions was stayed. 105 The dissent vehemently disagreed, contending that the majority overturned decades of
case law designed to protect against multiple punishment for a
single act. 106 The dissent recognized that the' purpose of Penal
Code section 654 was to prevent multiple punishment for the
same act, and argued that the majority violated this proscription by counting Benson's 1980 burglary and assault with intent to commit murder as two separate strikes. 107

victions, if the trial court concludes that it is "in furtherance of justice." Romero, 917
P.2d at 630.
101. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557.
102. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 199'1).
103. See id.
104. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557.
105. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J.; Baxter, J.; Brown, J. concurring). Chief Justice George wrote the opinion for the majority. See id. at 564.
106. See id. (Chin, J; Mosk, J.; Werdegar, J. dissenting). Justice Chin wrote the
opinion for the dissent. See id. at 571.
107. See id. at 564.
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THE MAJORITY OPINION

In Benson, the California Supreme Court determined that
Benson's prior felony convictions for residential burglary and
assault with intent to commit murder counted as two strikes
rather than as one strike. 108 The court fIrst analyzed the plain
language of the Three Strikes law, section 1170.12, and determined that a stay of execution of sentence pursuant to Penal
Code section 654 did not affect consideration as a prior conviction or a strike. l09 Additionally, the court reviewed the legislative history and purpose of the Three Strikes law and held that
the legislature intended to count prior convictions as strikes. 110
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court upheld Benson's
conviction of twenty-fIve years to life. lll

1.

Statutory Interpretation: Determining What is a "Strike"

To determine whether Benson had one or two strikes, the
majority mst looked to the plain meaning of the sentence enhancement law, Penal Code section 1170.12.112 The court examined whether the legislature explicitly declared that subsequent penal or administrative action could be based on stayed
convictions.1I3 Following the appellate court's analysis, the
court recognized the well settled rule that "[w]hen statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it."1I4 The court

108. See id. at 558.
109. See id. The California Supreme Court in Benson decided the case de novo.
The court reviewed the trial court's determination that the defendant had two prior
qualifying felony convictions that rendered him subject to sentence as a third strike
offender. The court analyzed the plain language of the Three Strikes law, and the
legislative history and purpose of the law. The court held that the trial court had properly found the defendant as having two prior strikes, and affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeal which had also found the Benson to be a third strike offender. See id.
at 565. When a court is reviewing de novo, it is starting "[alnew; afresh; a second time."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). This means that the court gives no deference to previous courts' position. See id.
110. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 558.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 559.
113. See id. at 560.
114. [d. (quoting People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288 (Cal. 1986)). The Supreme
Court noted that the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion, recognizing the rule that "[wlhere the statute is clear, courts will not interpret away clear
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noted that section 1170.12(b)(1) expressly provides that a stay
of execution of sentence "shall not affect the determination of a
prior conviction. "115
The court also consid~red its own precedent established in
People v. Pearson.1I6 In Pearson, the court held that when a
defendant's guilty plea results in a conviction of two or more
crimes, and Penal Code section 654 bars multiple punishment
for the crimes because they are based on the same criminal act,
the crimes could not be used as separate prior convictions in
subsequent proceedings.l17 Subsequent penal action, however,
may be based on the stayed convictions if the legislature explicitly declares this intent. 118 In Benson, the court concluded
that the statutory language of the Three Strikes law was sufficiently clear to overcome the general rule of Pearson. 119 The
legislature had explicitly declared that subsequent penal action

language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist." Benson, 954 P.2d at 560 (quoting People v. Coronado, 906 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Cal. 1995». The appellate court stated
that it need go no further than the language used in the Three Strikes law, as the
language of the statute is clear. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 560.
115. Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. The majority suggested that the dissent's interpretation of section 1170.12(b)(I) would be to replace the phrase "[t]he stay of execution of
sentence, except those stays mandated by section 654." Id. The majority then concluded that this proposed construction of the statute does not reflect the meaning that
the legislature intended. See id. See supra note 39 for the language of Penal Code
section 1170.12(b).
116. 721 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986).
117. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. See also Pearson, 721 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986). In
Pearson, the defendant committed acts of sodomy upon two children. See id. at 596.
For each of his acts, he was convicted of two offenses, sodomy with a child under 14
years of age, and lewd conduct. The trial court imposed a sentence for the lewd cOnduct
convictions, but stayed the sentence on the sodomy convictions, pursuant to Penal Code
section 654, so the defendant would not be punished twice for the same act. See id. In
affirming the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of California held .that the
defendant could not be subjected to future enhancements based on all four of his convictions. See id. at 600-601. Instead, the court could only enhance his sentence based
on convictions where the defendant received an actual sentence, not when it was
stayed. See id. However, the court noted that the Legislature could explicitly declare
that subsequent penal or administrative action could be based on stayed convictions.
See id. at 601. Yet without this declaration, the court was bound by section 654, which
prohibits a defendant from being disadvantaged as a result of the stayed convictions.
See id. See supra note 94 for explanation of Penal Code section 654.
118. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559.
119. See id. at 561.
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might be based on convictions stayed pursuant to Penal Code
section 654. 120
The Supreme Court dismissed several arguments that the
trial court erred by treating Benson as a third strike offender. 121 First, the court addressed the defendant's contention
that the Three Strikes law cannot overcome the general rule of
Pearson, because the law does not specifically refer to a stay of
execution of sentence under section 654. 122 The court rejected
this argument, noting that the Three Strikes law explicitly
states in its introductory clause that a strike for purposes of
the' statute "shall be defined" as set forth in §1170.12(b)
"[n]otwithstanding any other law .... "123
Second, the court dismissed Benson's argument that interpreting the Three Strikes law to include convictions stayed
pursuant to section 654 would encourage prosecutors to "overcharge" defendants. 124 In response, the majority noted that its
holding in Pearson clearly recognized that the Legislature was
free to adopt a sentencing scheme that abolished the holdings
of the courts regarding the sentencing of repeat offenders. 125
Finally, noting that the Three Strikes law did not require
the electorate to enumerate each type of stay the electorate intended to override, the majority concluded that the defendant's
argument failed to defer to the language of the Three Strikes

120. See id.
121. [d.
122. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. Benson argued that in order for a sentence that
is stayed under section 654 to count as a strike, the Three Strikes law should be more
explicit. See id. Instead the Three Strikes law generally states that the stay of execution of sentence will not affect what is to be considered as a strike. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.12(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
123. Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. The court determined that this clause prevented the
Three Strikes law from being limited, and could include any type of stay. The mlijority
also noted that the initiative version of the Three Strikes law was enacted after Pearson, concluding that the provision must be interpreted to include convictions stayed
pursuant to section 654. See id.
124. [d.
125. See id. at 562. The court determined that in enacting the Three Strikes law,
the electorate abolished the holdings of other courts in accordance with the holding in
Pearson. See id.
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law. l26 The Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature and
the electorate expressly stated that each conviction for a serious or violent felony should count as a strike regardless of
whether the prior sentence was stayed. 127

2.
Ballot History and Legislative Intent of the Three Strikes
Law
The California Supreme Court next reviewed the history of
the Three Strikes law and the arguments made in support of
the legislation before it was enacted. l28 The court recognized
that ballot arguments accompanying an initiative might be
considered in determining the electorate's intent in adopting
the measure. l29 The court observed that neither the 'ballot arguments accompanying the initiative nor the legislative analysis indicated that strikes were limited to convictions that received a sentence. l30 The ballot arguments and legislative
analysis also failed to indicate that strikes could not include

126. See id. The defendant argued that a stay can arise in a number of contexts
other than stays granted under section 654. For example stays can be mandatory
where the term imposed is prohibited by law or exceeds the limitation on the overall
aggregate term. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 447).
Also, trial courts allow temporary stays of sentences to permit defendants to get their
personal affairs in order. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (citing People v. Karaman, 842
P.2d 100 (Cal. 1992)).
127. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 560. The court determined that indeed stays do arise
in contexts other than those granted under section 654, and noted that this fact "em·
phasizes the great significance that [the court) should accord to the use of broad language by the electorate and the Legislature to exclude all stays of execution of sentence, without qualification or exception." Id. at 562. The court also recognized that
the defendant contended to the rule that "[t)o create an exception [to section 654), the
other statute need not refer to section 654 explicitly." Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Hicks, 863 P.2d 714 (Cal. 1993)). In Hicks, the California Supreme Court examined Penal Code section 667.6(c), to determine if it overrode
p~ovisions in Penal Code section 654. See Hicks, 863 P.2d at 719. Section 667.6(c)
authorizes consecutive full-term sentences for enumerated sexual offenseEi "whether or
not the crimes were committed during a single transaction." The Hicks court concluded
that the legislature did not have to cite section 654 in section 667.6(c) in order to override section 654. See id.
128. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562.
129. See id. (citing People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996)).
130. See id. at 562. Some ballot arguments reviewed by the majority included:
"[Serious or violent) [c)onvictions [committed) before 1994 ... are counted as strikes;"
"[I)f the person has two or more previous serious or violent felony convictions, the
mandatory sentence for any new felony conviction ... is life imprisonment ... ." Id.
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prior convictions that had been stayed pursuant to section
654. 131
The court also focused on the legislative intent behind the
Three Strikes law. 132 The bill did not expressly require that
prior convictions be derived from separate criminal acts. l33 The
court reasoned that if only certain types of stays were to be included within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, the electorate or the Legislature could have so indicated. l34 The court
determined that nothing in the bill suggested that the legislature intended an exception for prior convictions where the sentence was stayed under section 654. 135 Thus, the court concluded that, in light of the electorate and legislative intent, and
the purpose and objectives underlying the Three Strikes law,
convictions stayed pursuant to section 654 of the Penal Code
may count as separate strikes. 136
The Supreme Court explained the purpose for considering a
person who committed two crimes against a single victim in a
single act and received only one sentence as a second strike
offender. 137 The legislature and the electorate sought to ensure
that a defendant's prior serious and violent felony convictions
would count as strikes, despite whatever leniency a court had

131. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562.
132. See Assembly Bill No. 971, (1993·1994 Reg. Sess.).
133. See id. at p. 9. The Bill stated:
This bill does not contain any requirement that the prior offenses be separate.
Thus, a single act of robbery of three people in a store could result in a
sentence of twenty·five years to life. Likewise, one case with two counts of a
serious felony would subject the defendant to a life sentence for any future
felony.
[d.

134. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563.
135. See id. (citing People v. Superior Court (Himmelsbach), 230 Cal. Rptr. 890, 898
n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986». In Himmelsbach, the people argued that the language of
Penal Code section 12311 (which prevented persons who were convicted of certain
crimes from receiving probation or a suspended sentence) precluded a stay under sec·
tion 654. However, the Himmelsbach court rejected this contention, stating the legisla·
ture could have included an exception for sentences stayed under 654, but it did not.
See Himmelsbach, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 898. Similarly, the Benson court determined that
if the Three Strikes law was only meant to include certain types of stays, the electorate
and the legislature could have so indicated. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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previously afforded the defendant at sentencing.l38 Thus, regardless of whether the violent felony consisted of a single or
several acts, a repeat felon should be treated as a second strike
offender. 139
With legislative goals in mind, the court applied the Three
Strikes law to the case at bar.140 According to the legislature,
Benson's two prior felony convictions yielded two strikes. 141 He
received the benefit of section 654 in his earlier proceeding and
received a single sentence. 142 Only when Benson reoflEmded did
he face prolonged incarceration. l43 The court reasoned that the
Three Strikes law provided Benson with notice that he would
be treated as a recidivist if he reoffended, and he chose to ignore that notice. 144 Thus, the California Supreme Court treated
Benson as a second strike offender pursuant to the Legislative
and electorate intent. 145
The court rejected Benson's argument that treating a defendant who committed two crimes against a single victim in a
single act and who received one sentence as a second strike offender is contrary to the principles behind the Three Strikes
law. 146 The court found that the electorate and Legislature

138. See id. at 564.
139. See id. at 563, (citing People v. Askey, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996». In Askey, the defendant contended that the Three Strikes law failed to give
adequate notice of the specific punishment to be imposed in a third strike case. The
defendant argued that the law is unclear on how courts are to determine how many
strikes a defendant has. The court held that the defendant's thirteen prior felony convictions provided adequate notice of the penalty to be imposed. See Askey, 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 785.
140. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 564.
144. See id. The court stated that the Three Strikes law provided Benson with notice that he would be treated as a recidivist if he reoffended. The ml\iority concluded
that Benson must bear the consequences of his actions since he chose to ignore that
notice and commit another felony. See id.
145. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564. The court also noted that their analysis does not
suggest a repeal of section 654, and the opinion should not affect the application of
section 654 in other contexts. See id.
146. See id. See also Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No.
S061678 (filed Oct. 29, 1997). Benson argued that the purpose of the recidivist statute
is to punish more severely persons who persist in violating the law. Benson contended
that if an offender has committed one prior act he or she is eligible for enhanced sen-
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could rationally conclude that a person who had committed additional violence during a prior serious felony should be treated
more harshly than someone who committed the same initial
felony without the violence. 147 According to the court, Benson
demonstrated that he posed a more serious threat to public
safety because of his needless violence in 1979, and now deserved a harsher sentence. 148
Finally, the court rejected Benson's assertion that "dramatic
and harsh results" would result if the court interpreted the
Three Strikes law as qualifying a prior conviction for a serious
or violent felony that had been stayed under section 654 as a
separate strike. 149 The court stated it was not at liberty to alter
the intended effect of the statute on such grounds. l50 However,
the court noted that a trial court retains discretion to strike
one or more prior felony convictions in the interest of justice,
thereby preventing possible "dramatic and harsh results."151
After examining the language of section 1170.12 and the
statute's legislative intent, the California Supreme Court concluded that Benson had two strikes, not one. 152 The court remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing because the

tencing as a ~second striker." However, that individual has not committed the repeated
criminal acts required for the imposition of the harshest sentence provided by the statute. See id.
147. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564. Examples of criminal acts with additional violence the court cited included shooting or pistol-whipping a victim during a robbery, or
assaulting a victim during a burglary. See id.
148. See id. The court stated that the facts of the present case provide a classic illustration of a criminal act with additional violence: ~in stabbing his victim approximately 20 times, this defendant demonstrated that he posed a far greater threat to
public safety than a defendant who has committed a residential burglary without
committing such gratuitous violence." Id.
149. See id.
150. See id. (citing People v. Askey, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). The
Askey court rejected the defendant's claim that a sentence of 25 years to life in prison
was excessive "because all of his strikes were incurred in a single prior proceeding,"
leaving him only one chance before receiving an indeterminate sentence. Askey, 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786.
151. The court noted that in People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996), the
trial court retains its discretion under Penal Code section 1385. Benson, 954 P.2d at
564. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West Supp. 1999). Section 1385 states: "[t]he judge
or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." Id.
152. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565.
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trial court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority to strike
a prior conviction allegation. l53 However, the trial court has
since reaffirmed Benson's twenty-five year to life sentence,
rmding that it was not in the interests of justice to strike one of
his convictions. l54 Benson is now requesting review by the
Court of Appeal of the trial court's decision. 155
B.

JUSTICE CHIN'S DISSENTING OPINION

Although Justice Chin agreed with the majority that the defendant was a recidivist and deserved increased punishment
under the Three Strikes law, he disagreed with the majority's
holding. l56 Justice Chin believed that the majority's conclusion
overturned decades of case law designed to protect against
multiple punishment for a single criminal act. 157 Justice Chin
first examined the history of section 654 and the procedure

153. See id.
154. See Telephone Interview with Russell Babcock, Attorney for Appellant (Jan.
27, 1999).
155. See id.
156. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565 (Chin, J; Mosk, J.; Werdegar, J. dissenting). Justice Chin wrote the opinion for the dissent. See id. at 571. Justice Chin noted that the
Supreme Court had recently reviewed another Three Strikes case, in which he joined
the majority's holding. See People v. Fuhrman, 941 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1997). In Fuhrman, the court held that prior convictions need not have been brought and tried separately for each to qualify as a strike. See id. at 1190. Based upon a vehicle theft, in
1994 the defendant was convicted of robbery and unlawfully driving or taking an
automobile, and received a weapon enhancement because he used a dangerous weapon
in the commission of the robbery. However, the defendant had also been previously
charged with eleven counts of criminal offenses, stemming from an incident in 1989
where he had an accident in a stolen car and pulled a gun on the victim. See id. at
1192. From these charges, the defendant subsequently pled guilty to robbery and
assault with a firearm, and the remaining counts were dismissed. His assault charge
was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, since the court determined his crime
was one transaction. After he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law the defendant appealed, arguing since the first two strikes were not brought and tried separately, he had only one strike from the 1989 incident. See id. at 1193. The Supreme
Court concluded that both of the defendant's 1989 convictions qualified as strikes even
though they were brought and tried separately. See id. at 1200. In Benson, Justice
Chin noted that the Fuhrman court expressly reserved the issue whether a conviction
that could not be separately punished may be counted as a strike. However, because of
the history of section 654, Chin concluded a conviction that may not be separately
punished does not qualify as a separate strike. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566.
157. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin argued that
the majority's decision overturned various cases since the 1960s, which interpreted
Penal Code section 654. See id. at 566.
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courts adopted to implement it.l58 He then applied that history
in his analysis of the relevant portions of the Three Strikes
law. 159 Justice Chin argued that the majority's holding would
result in unfavorable consequences, because a defendant could
now receive three strikes from one incident. l60 Justice Chin
also argued that interpreting the Three Strikes law as allowing
one punishment for one act is consistent with the purpose of
the law and section 654. 161 In conclusion, Justice Chin would
have ruled that Benson had, only one strike and not two. 162

1.

Examination of the History of Section 654

In his dissent, Justice Chin noted that the original purpose
of Penal Code section 654 was to guarantee that a defendant
would not receive multiple punishments for a single act. l63 The
courts were faced with the task of protecting the defendant
from multiple punishments without providing the defendant
with an undeserved windfall. l64 Justice Chin also recognized
that, although multiple convictions are allowed when a defendant has committed several offenses based on a single act or an
indivisible course of conduct, multiple punishments are not. 165
As a result, he argued, the Three Strikes law should not be

158. See id. at 566-568.
159. See id. at 568·571.
160. See id. at 571.
161. See id.
162. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 571.
163. See id. at 566 (Chin, J., dissenting). See supra note 94 for the text of Penal
Code section 654.
164. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin, J., dissenting). For example, if a person
commits a battery with serious bodily injury and felony assault in a single act, and is
convicted of each crime, section 654 would prohibit multiple punishment. The defendant would be sentenced for felony assault, which proscribes the longest punishment.
Yet the courts were faced with the dilemma of ensuring that the defendant would not
be set free if the felony assault charge was dismissed. See id.
165. See id. Justice Chin relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pearson, 721
P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986), where the court recognized the general rule that "defendants may
be charged with and convicted of multiple offenses based on a single act or an indivisible course of conduct." Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (quoting Pearson, 721 P.2d at 596)
(Chin, J., dissenting). However, Chin noted, the courts had to decide how to treat multiple convictions that could be punished but once. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin,
J., dissenting). See supra note 117 for facts and holding of Pearson.
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read to increase punishment when multiple convictions resulted from one act. 166
Justice Chin noted that early courts were often inconsistent
in applying the law. 167 Several courts set aside excess convictions in order to avoid double punishment instead of staying
the sentence. l68 In People v. Niles,169 the court developed the
modern procedure of staying the impermissible punishment by
staying the sentence on the lesser offense. 170 This procedure
allowed the court to simultaneously convict the defendant of
multiple offense and avoid multiple punishment. l7l

166. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566.
167. See id.
168. See id. See People v. McFarland, 376 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1962). In McFarland, after someone detected their stolen vehicle at the defendant's house, the police searched
the defendant's residence, and discovered stolen articles from several different burglaries. See id. at 451. Even though he received two cOnvictions from one of the incidents,
the Supreme Court found that a sentence could not be imposed for both because of
Penal Code section 654's prohibition of punishment for multiple convictions from one
transaction. See id. at 455. Thus, the court decided to set aside the excess conviction,
finding "[tlhe appropriate procedure therefore, is to eliminate the effect of the judgment
as to the lesser offense insofar as the penalty alone is concerned." Id. at 457 .. In Ben·
son, Justice Chin noted this was the procedure until the modern method of staying the
impermissible punishment developed. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin, J., dissenting).
169. 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964). In Niles, the defendant was convicted of
burglary and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. See id. at
13. The Court of Appeal held that pursuant to Penal Code section 654, the defendant
could not be punished for both the burglary and assault, since they arose from the
same transaction. In order to avoid double punishment, ·the court stayed the sentence
on the burglary charge. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the stay of execution
of sentence, since the defendant's actions constituted an indivisible transaction. See id.
at 15.
170. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566.
171. See id. Justice Chin acknowledged several other cases where the stay procedure had been further developed. See id. In In re Wright, 422 P.2d 998 (Cal. 1967), the
defendant was convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, first degree robbery
of the first victim, and first degree robbery on another victim. See Wright, 422 P.2d at
999. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences for the kidnapping and robbery of
the first victim, even though section 654 prohibited multiple punishment because the
crimes were based on one act. The Supreme Court determined that concurrent sen· .
tencing would not satisfy section 654, and cited the then new stay procedure of People
u. Niles as a valid method to satisfy section 654. The court then set aside the sentence
for the robbery. See Wright, 422 P.2d at 1002. Justice Chin noted the (.'Ontribution to
the modern stay procedure made in Pearson. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 566 (Chin, J.,
dissenting). In Pearson, the Supreme Court balanced the potential windfall to the
defendant in the chance that a conviction might be reversed and the prejudice to him in
allowing separate sentences for different convictions from a single incident. The court
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Acknowledging that California courts have followed this
stay procedure for the last three decades, JustiCe Chin believed
that the procedure satisfied section 654's mandate that the
stayed conviction "under no condition, can operate to [defendant's] prejudice."172 Justice Chin asserted that by allowing a
sentence to be enhanced based on a conviction stayed pursuant
to section 654, the majority was overturning decades of case
law and an established sentencing procedure. 173

2.
The Statutory Language, Legislative History, and Purpose of the Three Strikes Law
In first evaluating the statutory language of section 654,
Justice Chin recognized that "[s]ection 654 ... is presumed to
govern every case to which it applies by its terms-unless some
other statute creates an express exception."174 Justice Chin
asserted the Three Strikes law did not create an express exception that would overrule the proscription of double punishment
in section 654. 175 Justice Chin argued that Benson's sentence

then determined the procedure of staying the sentence instead of reversing. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 599 (citing In re Wright, 422 P.2d at 1001-1002). Justice Chin noted
that the Pearson court concluded that "[a)ny subsequent sentences imposed on defendant can be enhanced on the basis of the convictions for which he served a sentence;
but convictions for which service of sentence was stayed may not be so used unless the
Legislature explicitly declares that subsequent Penal or administrative action may be
based on such stayed convictions." Justice Chin also noted that the Pearson court
specifically stated that "if defendant here were subjected to future sentence enhancements based on his stayed convictions, this would also constitute the type of 'incremental punishment' that section 654 forbids." Benson, 954 P.2d at 567 (quoting Pearson, 721 P.2d at 601) (Chin, J., dissenting). See supra note 39 for definition of a stayed
sentence.
172. Benson, 954 P.2d at 568 (quoting People v. Niles, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11, 15 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1964» (Chin, J., dissenting).
173. See id.
174. Id. (quoting People v. Siko, 755 P.2d 294 (Cal. 1988). In Siko, the defendant
was convicted of three current felonies: rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct with a child, all
involving the same child in the same incident. The court sentenced the defendant to
consecutive terms for each of the three felonies. The defendant appealed, arguing that
he could not be punished separately for all three convictions because he only committed
two acts under Penal Code section 654. The prosecution argued that section 654's bar
to multiple punishment was eliminated with respect to consecutive sentencing for the
three offenses by Penal Code section 667.6(c). The Siko court disagreed, finding that
no where in section 667.6 was section 654 expressly mentioned, and reiterated the rule
that repeal by implication is disfavored. See Siko, 755 P.2d at 296.
175. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated
"[n)othing in this language explicitly declares that a conviction for which section 654
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was stayed only to comply with section 654's mandate that the
conviction could not be used for any penal purpose. 176 Accordingly, Justice Chin concluded that Benson's assault with intent
to commit murder conviction, stayed pursuant to section 654,
should not count as a strike. 177
Justice Chin agreed with the majority that under Pearson a
defendant's sentence could not be enhanced based on prior convictions which have been stayed pursuant to section 654 unless
the Legislature explicitly declared that subsequent penal or
administrative action may be based on the stayed convictions. 178 However, unlike the majority, he argued that nothing
in the language of the Three Strikes law explicitly declared
that a conviction for which section 654 prohibited punishment
could be counted as a separate strike. 179 Justice Chin asserted
that "[t]he mere reference to a stay of execution of sentence is
not such an explicit declaration. It is not the stay that affects
[a] conviction's use as a strike; it is section 654."180 Therefore,
Justice Chin concluded that the language of the Three Strikes
law was not sufficiently clear to overcome the requirements of
Pearson. 181
Justice Chin also criticized the majority's determination
that language in the Three Strikes law overcame the rule of
Pearson. 182 The majority stated that the language of the introductory clause of the Three Strikes law, "[n]otwithstanding any
other law ... a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined
as ... " made it clear that the Legislature intended that a defen-

prohibits punishment can be a separate strike." Id. at 568 (citing Pearson, 721 P.2d
60l).
176. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 568-569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated
that:
It does not violate section 654 to enhance a sentence for a prior conviction
because the defendant is being punished for recidivism. But it does violate
that section to enhance a sentence twice, once each for two prior convictions, if
the convictions arose from the same act within the meaning of the section.
[d. at 568-569 (citing Pearson, 721 P.2d at 602).
177. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 568. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 601.
179. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 568 (Chin, J., dissenting).
180. [d. at 569.
181. See id. at 568.
182. See id. at 569.
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dant's sentence could be enhanced based on stayed convictions. l83 Justice Chin disagreed with this interpretation of the
statute because the language of the Three Strikes law referred
only to the definition of a qualifying conviction. l84 He maintained that nothing in the Three Strikes law mandated that a
person be punished twice for the same act. l85 Justice Chin concluded that the language of the Three Strikes law could be
clearer, despite the majority's conclusion that it could not
"imagine language clearer or more unequivocal. "186
Justice Chin also criticized the majority's reliance on the intent of the legislature and the electorate. 187 The majority determined that the legislature and the electorate intended that
all serious or violent convictions should count as strikes. l88 He
contended that the legislative analysis of the Assembly Bill did
not demonstrate that the legislature and the electorate intended to allow multiple strikes for a single act. 189 Justice Chin
noted that the majority should not have relied on information
from the Assembly Bill because it did not apply to Benson's
case. l90 Justice Chin argued that even the example used in the

183. Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting).
184. See id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b) (West Supp. 1999). The relevant
portions of section 1170.12 provide that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and for the purposes of this
section, a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as ... (1) Any offense
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state ...
None of the following dispositions shall affect the determination that a prior
conviction is a prior felony ... (A) The suspension of imposition of judgment or
sentence. (B) The stay of execution of sentence.
[d.
185. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated that
this language "falls far short of an explicit declaration that the Three Strikes law has
abrogated the fundamental promise that section 654 has made for over a century that a
person will not be punished twice for the same act." [d.
186. Benson, 954 P.2d at 560, 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin stated that if
the Legislature and the electorate had really intended to allow multiple strikes for a
single act, the language could have been more explicit. For example, the Three Strikes
law could have stated: "Multiple convictions arising out of the same act or omission
shall be multiple strikes." [d. at 569 n.2.
187. See id. at 569.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting).
190. See id. Justice Chin stated that the report was relevant to People v. Fuhrman,
941 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1997), that was brought and tried separately from Benson. See id.
The Fuhrman court considered the legislature's intent in determining whether prior
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Assembly Bill report, a crime of violence against multiple victims, did not apply to Benson, as section 654 did not prohibit
multiple punishment against multiple victims. 191

3.

Unfavorable Consequences of the Majority Decision

Justice Chin predicted that unfavorable consequences would
arise from the majority decision. l92 Under Benson, Chin argued, a defendant could receive three strikes from a single incident. l93 To illustrate his point, Justice Chin gave an example
of a person who stops a pedestrian at knifepoint, and demands
a watch. l94 Based on such an act, a person could be convicted of
false imprisonment, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted robbery. 195 Each statutory violation would count as a
felony because a deadly weapon is involved. l96 Hypothetically,
that person could have three strikes stemming from this one
incident, because each felony would qualify as a strike. l97 Justice Chin stated that while trial judges might dismiss the excess convictions in order to avoid multiple strikes, dismissal
was not the appropriate solution because the purpose of section
654 was to avoid dismissal. l98 Thus, Justice Chin argued that
the stayed convictions should be preserved for the chance that
the conviction for which the sentence was actually imposed is
later dismissed 199

felony convictions must have been brought and tried separately in order to quali1Y as
multiple strikes. See Fuhrman, 941 P.2d at 1193.
191. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563. The majority cited the example that -a single act
of robbery of three people in a store could result in a sentence of 25 years to life. Like·
wise, one case with two counts of a serious felony would subject the defendant to a life
sentence for any future felony." [d. (alteration in original). Justice Chin argued that
that scenario involves a crime of violence against multiple victims. See id. at 569
(Chin, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting).
197. See id.
198. See id. Moreover, Justice Chin stated, the stay procedure has been the prac·
tice for 30 years. See id.
199. See id.
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Justice Chin also attacked the majority's description of section 654 as providing the defendant with leniency.200 He stated
that section 654 had served as a basic and necessary provision
of California's criminal justice system for over a century, managing to ensure that no person may be punished more than
once for a single act involving a single victim. 201 He stressed
that the court was neither lenient in sentencing Benson in
1980, nor was the court lenient now.202 Instead, Justice Chin
found Benson's treatment as a two-strike offender to be excessive.203

4.
Interpreting the Three Strikes Law as Allowing One Punishment for One Act is Consistent with the Purpose of the Three
Strikes Law and Section 654
Justice Chin further argued that permitting an exception
for a stay pursuant to section 654 will not make the Three
Strikes law's reference to "[t]he stay of execution of sentence"
meaningless. 204 He contended that other types of stays could be
included within the meaning of the statute.205 As examples,
Justice Chin referred to a stay granted for probation and also
to a stay granted when a defendant's appeal is pending.206 Justice Chin argued that this portion of the Three Strikes law prevented defendants from claiming a conviction was not a strike
merely because it was stayed.207 Justice Chin asserted that the
provision was meant to include other types of stays, and that

200. See id.
201. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting).
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (citing In re Wright, 422 P.2d 998, 1002 (Cal.
1967)) (Chin, J., dissenting). The Wright court noted these examples in determining
whether to follow the then new stay procedure created in People v. Niles. See Wright,
422 P.2d at 1002. Justice Chin also recognized that a stay is permitted if the term
exceeds statutory limits or to allow defendants to put their affairs in order. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting).
207. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). As an example, Justice
Chin stated that "if a person is convicted of a serious felony and sentenced to state
prison, but the court stays the sentence pending appeal, and the person then commits
another felony, the earlier conviction could qualifY as a strike despite the stay." Id.
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this interpretation was consistent with the purpose of section
654.208
Justice Chin denied the majority's assertion that he was
rewriting the Three Strikes law to provide that "the stay of
execution of sentence, except those stays mandated by section
654" shall count as strikes. 209 However, Justice Chin argued
the ftmdamental principle of section 654 was that a person may
be punished only once for the same act; the stay was merely a
procedural tool devised to comply with that principle. 210 This
stay procedure has existed for almost three decades, and the
language of the Three Strikes law was not explicit enough to
change it.211 Instead, he argued the majority transformed the
Three Strikes law to require that regardless of how a conviction
was stayed, it would count as a strike. 212
5.
Benson's Single Intent Should Preclude Multiple Punishment Under the Three Strikes Law
Justice Chin agreed with the majority that a person who
committed additional violence in the course of committing a
felony deserved harsher treatment than an individual who
committed the same felony without the additional violence. 213
Yet his opinion diverged from the majority's because Justice
Chin focused on crimes committed with different intents. 214 He
recognized that section 654 does not prohibit multiple punishment for all crimes committed on one occasion. 215 Rather, mul208. See id.
209. [d. See supra note 115 for the majority's discussion on the dissent's interpretation of section 1170.12(b)(1).
210. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570-571 (Chin, J., dissenting).
211. See id. at 570.
212. See id. at 570-571. Justice Chin stated that "[dlefendant expressly recognizes
that 'The use of the term "stay" in the three strikes statutes explicitly states that a
prior may be used as a "strike" even though execution of sentence was stayed.'" However, Justice Chin agreed with the defendant that "it is not the 'stay' that is at the
heart of the rule reiterated in Pearson; it is the multiple use of priors arising from a
single criminal 'act.'" [d. at 571 n.3.
213. See id. at 57l.
214. See id.
215. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 57l. Justice Chin stated that courts have permitted
multiple punishment for multiple sex crimes against the same victim, for a robbery and
assault on the same victim, for multiple shots fIred at the same victim, and most importantly he noted, for burglary and rape when the purpose of the burglary was theft.
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tiple punishment is prohibited for crimes if the perpetrator has
a single intent. 216 He cited the example of Benson's 1979 criminal act for which he was convicted of burglary and assault with
intent to commit murder after he stabbed his neighbor over
twenty times. 217 Justice Chin claimed Benson committed no
"additional" violence during this crime because Benson's intent
for both the burglary and the assault constituted one act of
violence on his neighbor. 218 Thus, although a defendant who
commits "additional" violence with separate intents deserves
harsher treatment, Justice Chin believed Benson did not deserve harsher treatment because his act in 1979 against his
neighbor involved only one intent. 219
Finally, Justice Chin agreed with the majority that the
Three Strikes law provides a defendant with notice that if he or
she reoffends, the defendant will be treated as a recidivist. 220
He agreed that the Three Strikes law provided Benson with
such notice. 221 However, Chin concluded, that although Benson
should be treated as a recidivist, he should not be punished
twice for the same act. 222

VI.

CRITIQUE

The majority erroneously concluded that the language of the
Three Strikes law was clear. The contention that a stay of execution of sentence should be more broadly interpreted is supported by clear statutory language, the legislative history of the

See id. (citing People v. Latimer, 858 P.2d 611, 617 (Cal. 1993». In each of these situations, Justice Chin explained, under Fuhrman, multiple strikes would be allowed. See
Benson, 954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting). See Latimer, 858 P.2d at 612. In
Latimer, the defendant kidnapped a woman, drove her into the desert, and then raped
her and left her behind. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant could not
be punished for both the kidnapping and the rape under 654, since the defendant had
only a single intent and objective. See id. at 616.
216. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting).
217. See id.
218. [d.
219. [d.
220. See id.
221. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting).
222. See id. Chin stated "[tlhe issue is not whether defendant is a recidivist but
whether he should be punished twice for the same act. Defendant clearly had a strike
against him when he stole the cigarettes. The sole question is whether he had two
strikes. He did not." [d.
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Three Strikes law, and the history of Penal Code section 654.223
Furthermore, the majority's reliance on the ballot history of the
Three Strikes law and legislative intent is confused and inaccurate. The majority pieced together the language from the
ballot history in order to support its conclusion, and cited an
inappropriate example of the application of section 654 in its
argument. 224 In addition, the majority's conclusion that Benson
deserved a harsher sentence because he committed an additional act of violence is questionable, as Benson only had the
intent to commit a single felony. Further, the majority's reliance on dismissal as an alternative to preserving the conviction
with a stay may result in unwelcome results in the future. Finally, under the holdings of Benson and Romero, the discretion
awarded to trial courts may result in inconsistent judgments.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE THREE STRIKES LAw IS NOT
EXPUCIT

A.

The majority stated that it could not imagine the language
of the Three Strikes law to be clearer. 225 However, as Justice
Chin pointed out, it is quite easy to imagine clearer language. 226
Instead of merely stating that the "stay of execution of sentence" shall not affect the determination of what is a qualifying
strike, the Three Strikes law could provide that "[m]ultiple
convictions arising out of the same act or omission shall be
multiple strikes."227
When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
courts should not look beyond the plain meaning of the words
of the statute to interpret it.228 In addition, Penal Code section
654 should only yield to the Three Strikes law if the enhancement statute calls for a contrary result in "clear and unambi-

223. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998).
224. See id.
225. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 561. The legislature can overcome the mandate of
section 654 that a defendant can only receive one sentence for convictions arising from
a single transaction if it explicitly declares that subsequent penal action can be based
on the stayed convictions. See Pearson, 721 P.2d 595, 601 (Cal. 1986).
226. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting).
227. [d.
228. See id. at 560.
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guous terms."229 However, because the language of the Three
Strikes law is unclear, the court should have attempted a more
indepth interpretation and considered the purpose and history
of section 654.230 Section 654 was enacted to provide a guarantee to all defendants that they would not receive multiple punishments for a single criminal act, having one objective and one
intent.231 The Supreme Court had previously struck down a
similar challenge to section 654's bar to multiple punishment
because the legislature did not expressly mention the section,
stating that "repeal by implication is disfavored."232 Yet the
Benson majority disregarded this rule and defeated section
654's purpose by enhancing Benson's sentence based on a conviction for which he did not receive a sentence.233

229. MENASTER& RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 31. Critics have argued that the
Three Strikes law is far from clear and unambiguous that any exception for section 654
was intended: "[Penal Code sectionl 654 has been around for a long time, and it takes
very clear language to override it; this is not the situation here." [d.
230. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565 (Chin, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 568. Section 654 mandates that a conviction cannot be used for any
penal purpose. That section is violated by enhancing a sentence twice with two prior
convictions if the convictions arose from the same action. See id. See also People v.
Miller, 558 P.2d 552, 560-561 (Cal. 1977). The Supreme Court has recognized that the
purpose of section 654, which prohibits double punishment, is to ensure that a defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability. The defendant in
Miller was convicted of robbery in the fIrst degree, burglary in the fIrst degree, and
assault with a deadly weapon after robbing a jewelry store and shooting the store security guard, and received a sentence for each conviction. See id. at 555. The Supreme
Court reversed, fInding that section 654 precluded the imposition of sentence for the
assault conviction. The court held that the assault was committed during the same
course of conduct and against the same victim as in the case of the aggravated burglary
conviction and the defendant could not be punished for both of those convictions. See
id. at 56!.
232. People v. Siko, 755 P.2d 294, 296 (Cal. 1988). In Siko, the prosecution argued
that section 654's bar to multiple punishment was eliminated with respect to consecutive sentencing for the three offenses by Penal Code section 667.6(c). The Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that "[als a general rule of statutory construction, of course,
repeal by implication is disfavored. Such repeal is particularly disfavored when, as
here, the statute allegedly repealed expresses a legal principle that has been a part of
our penal jurisprudence for over a century." [d. See supra note 174 for further discussion of Siko. Courts of Appeal have also held that in other situations the Three Strikes
law did not override section 654. See People v. Martin, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995), holding that section 654 will sometimes bar consecutive sentences on multiple current convictions. See id. at 779. See also People v. McKee, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d
707,710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
233. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565. Benson did not receive a sentence for the assault
with intent to commit murder conviction, as it was stayed pursuant to section 654.
However, he did receive a ten-year sentence for the residential burglary charge. See
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The majority also asserted that the language of the Three
Strikes law is explicit enough to overcome the rule of Pearson,
and that subsequent penal or administrative action could be
based on stayed convictions.234 To overcome the rule from
Pearson, the Three Strikes law would have to explicitly state
that sentences stayed under the mandate of section 654 count
as strikes.235 However, the language of the Three StJikes law is
not clear and the Legislature did not clearly indicate whether
sentences could be enhanced based on sentences stayed pursuant to section 654.236 Thus, the language of the Three Strikes
law is not clear enough to overcome the rule of Pearson, and
under the current configuration sentences should not be enhanced based on convictions that were stayed pursuant to section 654.237
.
Because the Three Strikes law does not explicitly state
whether convictions that have been stayed under the mandate
of section 654 should count as strikes, the use of the term
"stay" in the statute is ambiguous. 238 Because the Supreme
Court has held that an ambiguous statute must be construed in
favor of the defendant, Benson's assault with intent to commit
murder conviction should not have counted as a strike. 239

also Respondent's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Dec. 29,
1997).
234. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 559. As the court stated in Pearson, "[w)ithout [an
explicit] declaration [that subsequent penal action may be based on a conviction stayed
under section 654], it is clear that section 654 prohibits defendant from being disad·
vantaged in any way as a result of the stayed convictions." [d. See Pearson, 721 P.2d
595 (Cal. 1986)..
.
235. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 601.
236. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 567 (Chin, J., dissenting). The majority's interpreta·
tion of the Three Strikes law disadvantages Benson, and other similarly situated defendants who have committed a single criminal act and received multiple convictions.
See id.
237. See id.
238. [d.
239. See People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Cal. 1986). In Overstreet, the
word "trial" as used in a sentence enhancement provision for felonies committed while
released pending trial was ambiguous as to whether it included proceedings following
determination of guilt prior to sentencing. The Supreme Court found that the ambiguity in the statute had to be construed in favor of the defendant. The court stated that:
When language which is susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal
law, the policy of this state is to construe the statute as favorably to the
defendant as its language and the circumstance of its application reasonably
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THE MAJORITY'S RELIANCE ON THE BALLOT HISTORY AND

LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS CONFUSED AND INACCURATE

The majority's conclusion that the ballot history and Legislative intent supported the use of any stayed conviction for
purposes of a strike is misguided. 240 The majority cited language from various congressional hearings and ballot pamphlets in support of its finding that the Three Strikes law overrides section 654 in specific circumstances. 241 However, it
seems that the majority pieced the language together to fit its
conclusion. 242 In addition, the language cited by the majority
does not clearly indicate that the Legislature or the electorate
intended to include convictions stayed pursuant to section 654
within the scope of the Three Strikes law. 243 Yet the majority
permit. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as
to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute. Strict
construction of penal statutes protects the individual against arbitrary
discretion by officials and judges and guards against judicial usurpation of the
legislative function which would result from enforcement of penalties when
the legislative branch did not clearly prescribe them.
Id. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (med Oct. 29,
1997). Similarly, since the Three Strikes law was ambiguous as to the fact if a conviction that is stayed pursuant to section 654 can count as a strike, Benson was entitled to
the benefit of the doubt of the legislature's and electorate's true intent. See id.
240. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562-563.
241. See id. See Michael Vitiello & Andrew J. Glendon, Article III Judges and the
Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1275,
1284 (1998). The ballot pamphlets themselves have been criticized as having misled
the public into voting for the electorate version of the Three Strikes law. The literature
has been attacked because of its reliance on a flawed study prepared by the office of
California Governor Pete Wilson. The study projected that "three strikes" would save
billions of dollars. Even more misleading were claims that the law targeted rapists,
child molesters, and murderers. Yet the study failed to reveal the fact that the Three
Strikes law would lead to long prison sentences for aging felons convicted of non-violent
third strike felonies. The public simply did not receive any contrary evidence. See id.
242. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562 (quoting Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop.
184, as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p.36). The majority quotes
language from the Ballot Pamphlet for Proposition 184 that "Islerious or violent convictions committed before 1994 are counted as strikes." Id. Yet this language came later
in the argument in favor of Proposition 184. Directly before this statement was the
story of Kimber Reynolds, the daughter of Mike Reynolds that was viciously murdered
by a "career criminal. n The argument went on to state that "3 Strikes keeps career
criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder, behind bars
where they belong." Id. Yet the argument failed to state that persons who receive
several convictions from one incident, some of which are stayed to avoid multiple punishment, will count as strikes. Voters were simply not given the information or the
opportunity to make this decision, and instead were given examples of extreme criminal behavior. See id.
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presumed that although the intent was not specified, all previous serious or violent felony convictions count as strikes even
when the convictions were stayed pursuant to section 654.244
Justice Chin correctly recognized the inaccuracy of the example cited by the majority in support of its argument that the
legislature and the electorate intended to include convictions
stayed pursuant to section 654 as strikes. 245 The majority's example was that a "single act of robbery of three people in a
store would subject the defendant to a life sentence for any future felony. »246 However, this example involves a crime of violence against multiple victims, not convictions stayed pursuant
to section 654.247 Section 654 does not prohibit multiple punishment for multiple victim crimes, and it does not apply to the
court's example. 248
C.
BENSON DID NOT COMMIT AN ADDITIONAL ACT OF
VIOLENCE

In Benson, the majority stated that Benson deserved to be
"treated more harshly" because he committed an additional act
of violence during the 1979 incident with his neighbor. 249 However, Justice Chin correctly noted that Benson did not commit

243. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562·563 (quoting Analysis by the Legis. Analyst, p.
33). The majority also quoted analysis by the Legislative Analyst, which also accom·
panied Proposition 184 that "[ilf the person has two or more previous serious or violent
felony convictions, the mandatory sentence for any new felony conviction is life impris·
onment." [d. Yet nothing in this language addresses convictions stayed pursuant to
section 654.
244. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 562-563.
245. See id. at 569.
246. [d. at 562 (quoting Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 971 Feb. 17, 1994, 1993-1994
Regular Session).
247. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting). If a defendant commits a
crime of violence against different individual victims, he or she can be sentenced for
each act on each person. See id. See People v. Latimer, 858 P.2d 611, 617 (Cal. 1993).
Section 654 only applies when the defendant's crimes constituted one act. See supra
note 215 for facts and holding of Latimer.
248. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 569 (Chin, J., dissenting).
249. Benson, 954 P.2d at 564. The majority stated that "the electorate and the
Legislature rationally could-and did-<:onclude that a person who committed additional violence in the course of a prior serious felony ... should be treated more harshly
than an individual who committed the same initial felony, but whose criminal conduct
did not include such additional violence." [d.
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an additional act of violence.250 Instead, Benson's acts against
his neighbor constituted one act of violence. 251 The burglary
was for the purpose of committing an assault, not for a different purpose, such as theft. 252 Under California's single felonious purpose doctrine, when the entry would be non-felonious
but for the intent to commit the assault, and the assault is an
integral part of the burglary, the defendant has committed only
a single act.253
Applying this doctrine to Benson, the elements of the burglary were the same as those of the assault. 2M The felony intent that was used to prove the burglary conviction was the
intent to commit the assault on the victim, leaving Benson only
with the intent to commit a single felony.2M Benson's entry into
his neighbor's apartment would have been non-felonious but for
the intent to commit the murder.256 Therefore, Benson had no
criminal intent separate from the assault itself, and committed
only one act of violence. 257
D.
DISMISSAL IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE SOLUTION WHEN
THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED Two OFFENSES IN A SINGLE ACT

In rejecting the argument that dramatic and harsh results
will ensue from interpreting the Three Strikes law as qualify-

250. See Benson,.954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting).
251. See id.
252. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct.
29,1997).
253. See People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886 (Cal. 1984). In Smith, the defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder, felony child abuse, and child beating after she repeatedly assaulted her two-year-old daughter until she died. See id. at 888. The California Supreme Court held that since the acts constituting the child abuse were an
integral part of the child's death, the felony child abuse offense merged into the homicide and could not serve as the underlying felony to support the conviction for seconddegree murder under a felony-murder theory. See id. at 888-891. The court also recognized that although this case involved felony-murder, subsequent decisions have
applied the single felonious purpose rule to other felonies involving assault or assault
with a deadly weapon. See id. See People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1969) (involving
burglary with intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon).
254. Burglary requires that a defendant have an intention to commit a felony. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 8.13 (2d ed. 1986).
255. See Smith, 678 P.2d at 890-89l.
256. See id.
257. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, People v. Benson, No. S061678 (filed Oct.
29,1997).
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ing convictions stayed pursuant to section 654 as strikes, the
majority mentioned in a footnote that a trial court is free to
dismiss a prior conviction under Penal Code section 1385.258
Thus, the court implied that it might be an abuse of discretion
for a judge not to dismiss a conviction stayed under section 654
when multiple convictions arise from a single act.259 However,
as Justice Chin argued, dismissal is not the appropriate solution. 260 Stayed convictions should be preserved in the event
that the conviction for which the punishment was imposed is
set aside for any reason.261 Otherwise, the defendant may receive a windfall and withstand no punishment at all. 262 As
suggested by Justice Chin, if the result of Benson's holding is
that courts entirely dismiss convictions governed by section
654, the prosecution may come to regret its victory.263 The result of a Penal Code section 1385 dismissal of a conviction is
that "[t]he defendant stands as if he had never been prosecuted
for the charged offense.''264 Dismissal will thus defeat the purpose of the sentence enhancement statute.
E.

UNDER THE HOLDINGS OF BENSON AND ROMERO, THE
DISCRETION AWARDED TO TRIAL COURTS MAy RESULT IN
INCONSISTENT JUDGMENTS

Two years before Benson, in People v. Romero,265 the same
court held that a trial court may, on its own motion, strike
prior felony conviction allegations in the "interest of justice."266

258. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564.
259. See id. See Alex Ricciardulli, Three Strikes and Form Motion Update,
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT CASES SINCE LAsT PDQ, 1 (1998). Although Benson has
allowed convictions stayed under Penal Code section 654 to count as strikes, all hope is
not lost. A court can still dismiss a conviction under Penal Code section 1385. A court
may even abuse its discretion if it does not dismiss the prior conviction. Furthermore,
there are constitutional due process concerns underlying Penal Code section 654, which
the Three Strikes law cannot override that may prevent multiple strikes. See id.
260. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting).
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. Ricciardulli, supra note 259, at 2 (quoting People v. Alvarez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
814, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd in part 928 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1997). The court held
that the result of a 1385 dismissal is that "[t)he defendant stanqs as if he had never
been prosecuted for the charged offense." [d.
265. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
266. Romero, 917 P.2d at 630.
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The Benson and Romero holdings change the whole landscape
of the Three Strikes law because the trial court has discretion
as to whether they should follow the sentencing guidelines
adopted by the Legislature and the electorate. 267 On one hand,
Romero makes it easier for recidivists to avoid an indeterminate life sentence prescribed by the Three Strikes law by
granting the trial court judge discretion to dismiss a qualifying
strike. 268 Yet, on the other hand, Benson grants a trial court
discretion to count a sentence stayed under Penal Code section
654 as a strike, making it harder on recidivists. 269 Thus, the
range of penalties may increase dramatically. 270
This situation is problematic because the Legislature and
the electorate may not have intended the court to have discretion to dismiss priors, or may not have intended that a stayed
conviction under section 654 should count as a strike. 271 Even
more uncertain is whether the Legislature and the electorate
intended for trial courts to have this much latitude in sentencing. 272

Due to a trial court's discretion, sentences may become inconsistent among the California courts, thereby frustrating
uniform determinate sentencing goals. 273 Because the Romero

267. See Interview with Mort Cohen, Professor of Law at Golden Gate University
School of Law, in San Francisco, CA. (Aug. 17, 1998). See Cal. Ct. Rule 428(a) (West
Supp. 1999). The California court rule setting forth the criteria for a judge to determine whether or not to impose enhancement states: "If the judge has statutory discretion to strike the additional term for an enhancement, the court may consider and
apply any of the circumstances in mitigation enumerated in these rules or, pursuant to
rule 408, any other reasonable circumstances in mitigation that are present." [d.
268. See Romero, 917 P.2d 628.
269. See Benson, 954 P.2d 557.
270. See Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role of Discretion in the
Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 257 (1998) (recognizing that discretion can enable participants in the criminal justice system to nullify legitimately
adopted sentencing laws and to impose inequitable sentences based on irrelevant characteristics of defendants and crimes).
271. See Interview with Mort Cohen, Professor of Law at Golden Gate University
School of Law, in San Francisco, CA. (Aug. 17, 1998).
272. See id.
273. See Kessler & Morrison Piehl, supra note 270, at 257. See Assembly Committee on Public Safety: Hearings on S. 2048 Before the Senate Committees on Judiciary,
Criminal Procedure and Budget and Fiscal Review, 199-1998 Legis., June 3D, 1998
(statement of Judith M. Garvey). The legislature has also been concerned with the
amount of discretion given to the trial court. As argued in a California Assembly
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decision did not derme what reasons justify dismissing strikes,
and Benson did not set guidelines on why a trial court should
count a stayed conviction under section 654 as a strike, the severity of sentences could greatly differ among defendants. 274 In
light of this unwieldy discretion, different defendants under
similar circumstances could potentially receive two completely
different sentences. 275
For example, a defendant with two strikes based on prior
convictions for robbery and residential burglary, who commits
another residential burglary must spend twenty-five years in
prison before being eligible for parole. 276 Another defendant in
the same circumstances may have the first residential burglary
dismissed because that the trial judge deemed it to be in the
interest of justice. 277 The second defendant would only have
two strikes under the Three Strikes law and could be sentenced
to thirteen years in prison. 278 Accordingly, under the court's
interpretation of the Three Strikes law and the discretion given
to the trial court, two defendants in the same circumstances
who committed the same crimes could have sentences differing
by twelve years.279

Committee on Public Safety in determining whether to limit what can count as a strike
to strictly felonies that are considered serious or violent:
Selective enforcement of the law is an ever·present risk, and the risks become
more significant when a life sentence can result from a non·violent offense.
Recent studies by the Judicial Council point out how proceedings sometimes
reflect the biases and prejudices of the larger society. Although prosecutors
have formed internal review procedures to reduce the chances that the law is
applied selectively, some panels conducting these reviews have little or no
representation.
[d.
274. See Interview with Mort Cohen, Professor of Law at Cffilden Gate University
School of Law, in San Francisco, CA. (Aug. 17, 1998).
275. See Pressman & Kaae, supra note 53, at 37.
276. See MENASTER & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 114. See supra note 47 for
explanation of the calculated sentence.
277. See Pressman & Kaae, supra note 53, at 33.
278. See MENASTER & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 47, at 11I.
279. See id. at 114.
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RAMIFICATIONS OF BENSON

Since its enactment in 1994, the Three Strikes Law has
been subject to much criticism and debate.280 Many critics
claim that the law is ineffective in deterring violent crime and
clogs the court system.281 The opposition to Three Strikes laws
illustrates the dangers of relinquishing judicial discretion. 282
However, there are those who believe that this is exactly how
justice ought to be carried out. 283 Many Three Strikes supporters are average Americans who are troubled by the prospect of
criminals returning to the streets after serving light sentences.284 They view judicial discretion in sentencing as something that is "just not working. "2B5 Others simply believe that
individual judges are cursed with many of the same biases and
prejudices as others in society.286 In their view, removing the
power to sentence from the hands of one judge and placing it in
the hands of the legislature creates a more balanced approach
to punishment. 287 Despite this apparent judicial hand-tying,
the power to dismiss a prior strike offense remains a "discretionary weapon in the trial judge's arsenal.»288
Justice Chin suggests that the majority's decision will result
in unfavorable consequences. 289 Although the exact consequences are not known yet, the Benson holding is sure to affect

280. See supra note 32 for discussion on recent movements to change the Three
Strikes law to only enhance sentences based on violent or serious felonies, rather than
other subsequent felonies. See also supra note 53 for discussion on the claims made by
critics that many offenders are receiving irrationally long sentences, even though they
did not commit violent or serious offenses.
281. See supra note 54 for discussion on how the Three Strikes law clogs both the
prisons and the court systems.
282. See Meredith McClain, Note, "Three Strikes And You're Out": The Solution To
The Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 120 n.12 (1996) (citing
Edwin E. Meese III, Three Strikes Laws Punish and Protect, INSIGHT, May 1994, at
20, to support the proposition that citizens generally do not trust discretionary sentencing laws).
283. See McClain, supra note 282, at 120 n.12.
284. See Daponde, supra note 53, at 556 (determining that Chapter 160, which
makes a strike for a parolee equivalent to that of a felon on probation, hinders judicial
discretion).
285. [d.
286. See McClain, supra note 282, at 120 n.12.
287. See id.
288. Daponde, supra note 53, at 556. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 628.
289. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting).
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scores of recidivist criminals throughout California. 290 Multiple
convictions often arise out of a single act, potentially resulting
in three strikes from one incident. 291 Under the Benson ruling,
the trial court could choose not to count all of the convictions
stayed under section 654 as strikes.292 Under Romero, however,
the court could also elect to dismiss one or more of the convictions in the interest of justice.293 Thus, that defendant could
potentially end up with a wide variety of sentences, depending
on how the trial court exercises its discretion. Either way, the
defendant may receive a punishment that does n.ot fit the
crime. 294 One can only ask is this what the voters really intended?
VIII. CONCLUSION .
The majority in Benson concluded that, in light of the declaration in the Three Strikes law, a stay of execution of sentence
would not affect the determination of what constitutes a strike.
Therefore, Benson's two prior felony convictions from the 1979
incident qualified as strikes.295 The majority found this conclusion to be consistent with the voters' expressed intent.296 The
California Supreme Court then affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeal, but remanded the case to the trial court for
resentencing, because the trial court had discretion :in striking
a prior conviction allegation.297 The court stated that it expressed no opinion as to how a trial court should exercise that
discretion.298

290. See Maura Dolan, State High Court Ruling Toughens 3-Strikes Law, L.A.
TIMES, May 15, 1998, at AI.

291. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting).
292. See id. at 558. See Dolan, supra note 290, at AI.
293. See Romero, 917 P.2d 628.
294. See supra note 133 for an example of an act that may result in three strikes.
See Steve Lawrence, Lawmakers Refuse to Narrow List of Felonies for '3 Strikes,' THE
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, June 5,1997, at A4.
295. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 564 (Cal. 1998).
296. See id.
297. See id. As the California Supreme Court held in Romero, the trial court has
the discretion to strike a prior conviction allegation in the "interest of justice" pursuant
to Penal Code section 1385. [d.
298. See id.
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Yet it remains questionable whether the legislature and
voters really intended for a single act that may only be punished once may generate two strikes.299 Allowing a smgle
criminal act with one intent to result in two strikes defeats
both the historY and purpose of section 654. 300 After the Supreme Court decisions in Benson and Romero trial courts are
encouraged to dismiss prior conviction allegations in order to
avoid multiple punishment for a single act. 301 The discretion
granted to trial courts by these two cases opens the door for
unfair sentences that will clog both the prisons and the appellate COurtS.302 Only time will tell if California courts and its
citizens will ultimately suffer from the reasoning of the Benson
decision.

Dawn Philippus *

299. See Interview with Russell Babcock, Attorney for Appellant Benson (Jan. 27,
1999).
300. See supra notes 225-239 for critique of how the Benson court's interpretation of
the Three Strikes law defeats the history and purpose of Penal Code section 654.
301. See supra note 151 and the accompanying text for the court's analysis of how a
strike should be dismissed if it is in the interests of justice.
302. See id.
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